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1. Introduction
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the first step in
assessing the financial attractiveness of water quality trading (WQT) in any given
watershed is to calculate dischargers' incremental costs of control (IC) [EPA, 2004].1
This is because IC, defined as the average cost of control of the incremental reduction
required for a discharger to achieve its target load, represents a better approximation of
a discharger's, or source's, upper-bound willingness to pay (WTP) for pollutant reduction
credits.2 The logic behind this statement is that each control "step", once implemented, is
a sunk cost. If a source had previously installed a control technology, its expense should
not influence the next step decision for pollutant control. As the EPA puts it, "if a source
implements step 1 control technology and is now looking toward a step 2 option, the IC
considers only the cost of the second step of control technology; the previous step cost is
sunk and is no longer part of the decision making analysis" [EPA , 2004, page 34].
This paper takes a close look at IC in the context of discrete, or discontinuous
abatement. In particular, the relationships between IC and both the traditional measure of
average cost of control (AC) and WTP is examined.3 Three questions about these
relationships are answered. First, is IC necessarily larger than AC, i.e., is it necessarily a
better approximation than AC of upper-bound WTP? Second, is IC a better
approximation than AC of WTP itself? Third, does the initial allocation of abatement

1

The referenced document, Water Quality Trading Assessment Handbook, is the EPA’s central document
on WQT, particularly with respect to the promotion of WQT throughout the United States.
2
Subtracting the source's target load from its current load results in the source's total reduction needed to
comply with its Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) abatement allocation. As far as this author is aware,
EPA [2004] is the only published document that discusses the IC as defined therein. Magat, et al. (1986)
consider a different type of IC, the calculation of which is based on the incremental reduction actually
achieved, rather than required. As shown below in Sections 3 and 4, the Magat, et al. (1986) definition of
IC is equivalent to what we have labeled average cost of control (AC) in this paper.
3
AC is equal to the total cost of a technology step divided by the number of abatement units achieved.
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responsibilities in the presence of discrete abatement affect trading outcomes differently
than when abatement is continuous? These questions are important because little is
presently known about IC and how it compares with AC and WTP. Indeed, if the
financial attractiveness of WQT is to be based on IC rather than AC (as suggested by the
EPA), it seems imperative to understand exactly how IC and AC differ. This imperative
is compounded by the fact that WQT in the US has thus far been rather unsuccessful as a
mechanism for meeting water quality standards established through the Clean Water Act
(King, 2005; Environomics, 1999). Further, while the pollution trading literature has
addressed a wide variety of issues that relate to the feasibility of market establishment,
the principle issue of discreteness in abatement units itself has yet to be considered in any
theoretical way. 4
In answer to the first question, we find circumstances under which IC may not exceed
AC. In particular, when the initial technology step (step1) is capable of meeting or
exceeding the source's target load, IC is at least as large as its corresponding AC.
However, when technology step 1 is incapable of achieving the source's target load, and
the source has not previously implemented its step 1 technology, IC exceeds its
corresponding AC only when the efficiency of its step 1 technology is large enough
relative to its subsequent technology steps. This result is explained in Section 4.

4

Prominent issues addressed in the pollution trading literature include the identification of optimal trading
ratios for non-point sources [Shortle, 1987 and 1990; Malik et al., 1993; Horan and Shortle, 2005; Farrow
et al., 2005; Hung and Shaw, 2005], empirical/numerical estimates of cost savings with pollution trading
[Fullerton et al., 1997; Bernstein et al., 1994; Hahn and May, 1994; Coggins and Smith, 1993; Bohi and
Burtraw, 1992; Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991; Hahn and Hester, 1989a and 1989b; Hahn, 1989], the roles
of transaction costs [Winebrake et al., 1995; Stavins, 1995, Lund, 1993; GAO, 1994; Montero, 1997],
market concentration/failure [Cason et al., 2003; Atkinson and Tietenberg, 2001; Misiolek and Elder, 1989;
Hahn, 1984; O'Neil, 1983], market size [Atkinson and Morton, 2004], banking [Wen et al., 2005; Germain
et al., 2004; Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996], noncompliance [Konishi, 2005; Keeler, 1991], moral hazard
[Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986], and price uncertainty [Baldursson and von der Fehr, 2004; Rubin, 2001;
Chao and Wilson, 1993].
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In answer to the second question, AC is indeed a better approximation than IC of a
source's WTP. This is because in the presence of discrete abatement units, AC is
identical to traditionally defined marginal control cost (MC). Since in general any source
is capable of being a buyer or a seller of pollution reduction credits depending upon its
choice of how much to abate relative to its target load, its WTP is ultimately its MC.
Thus, by a simple application of transitivity, a source's WTP equals its AC. Moreover,
given that IC will not necessarily exceed AC, IC is also not necessarily the appropriate
upper-bound WTP.
In answer to the third question, the determination of a trading outcome between two
sources in the presence of discrete abatement is markedly different than the
corresponding outcome with continuous abatement. The solution process for trading with
discrete abatement requires a comparison of the gains from trade associated with the full
sequence of possible “sunk cost trading” scenarios in any "move" away from the initial
allocation of abatement responsibilities. As demonstrated graphically in Section 5, corner
solutions (where one source is paid by the other to abate the entire aggregate amount to
meet the sources' target loads) are possible in the most common case, where trading
partners' respective AC curves "cross". 5
Only two previous studies have addressed the issue of discrete abatement, both
strictly in the context of numerical analysis and thus as a kind of epilogue to the main
thrust of their analyses. As a result, the principle differences between discrete and

5

The trading outcome between any two sources is not necessarily concomitant with a market equilibrium,
i.e., a market could conceivably be in disequilibrium even though a subset of sources have consummated a
series of bilateral trades. Our goal here is to compare the likely outcome of a bilateral trading process when
abatement is discrete versus continuous. The determination of any particular market equilibrium is beyond
the scope of our analysis.
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continuous abatement have not been adequately addressed in the literature.6 Fullerton et
al. [1997] find numerical evidence that in the presence of discrete abatement an electric
utility's compliance choices (e.g., across options such as fuel switching, investment in
abatement technology, and pollution trading) are highly sensitive to slight deviations in
the Public Utility Commission's (PUC's) "symmetric regulatory treatment" of shareholder
vs. ratepayer portions of the cost of sulfur dioxide permit purchases, the gain on permit
sales, the extra cost of fuel, and the cost of abatement technology. For example, a 1%
increase in the portion of permit costs shared by shareholders is enough to induce the
shareholders to completely eschew the purchase of permits resulting in substantial
increases in ratepayer expenditures on electricity. Thus, changes in PUC rules can
apparently sensitize an electric utility's abatement effort to its initial allocation of
abatement responsibility.
Montero [1997] similarly finds numerical evidence that in the presence of discrete
abatement, transaction costs, and uncertain regulatory policy, abatement effort across
sources (and thus aggregate control costs and credit price) is sensitive to the initial
allocation of abatement requirements, even when marginal transaction costs are constant.
As we show in Section 5, a source's abatement effort is sensitive to the initial allocation
of abatement responsibilities in the discrete case even without accounting for the types of
inefficiencies examined in Fullerton et al. [1997] and Montero [1997].

6

Nemetz and Drechsler (1979) and Rousseau and Proost (2005) also incorporate discrete abatement
technology in their respective numerical simulations, but discreteness is much less of a concern in their
analyses. See Halkos (1994) for an example of how discrete abatement is incorporated into a mathematical
model for determining cost-effective emissions control strategies subject to varying pollution control
targets, and similarly Becker, et al. (1993) for the development of an efficient allocation mechanism in the
presence of discreteness.

6

To establish a benchmark for our analysis, the next section presents the textbook
example of pollution trading when abatement units are continuous. Section 3 examines
the relationship between IC and AC in the context of a simple numerical example of a
watershed. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate exactly how these cost measures
are calculated. Section 4 provides a formal comparison of IC and AC, resulting in our
first main finding – IC does not necessarily exceed AC and thus is not a universally better
measure of upper-bound WTP. Section 5 recasts in discrete units the continuous-unit
pollution-trading example depicted in Section 2. This section demonstrates how
consideration of the gains from trade associated with a full sequence of possible sunk cost
trading scenarios is used to determine a trading outcome when the discontinuous AC
curves of any two trading partners cross, and explains our second main finding – that the
trading outcome in the presence of discrete abatement is inherently sensitive to the initial
allocation of abatement responsibilities. Section 6 concludes.
2. Water Quality Trading with Continuous Abatement Units
It is well-known that in the presence of continuous abatement WQT induces pollution
sources to voluntarily trade up to the least-cost abatement allocation. This result is
perhaps most easily understood in a graphical framework, as depicted in Figure 1. 7
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 shows the MCs for any two sources (1 & 2), where the level of abatement
for Source 1(2) increases from 0 to 25 units going left to right(right to left). In this
example, a total of 25 units of abatement across these two potential trading sources are
required by the regulatory authority; thus the horizontal axis depicts all possible
allocations of the 25 required abatement units between the two sources. As depicted in
7

See Tietenberg [2006] and Kolstad [2000] for further details about this framework.
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the figure, Source 2 faces relatively higher control costs than Source 1 per unit reduction.
Source 2 therefore has incentive to purchase abatement units from Source 1 whenever a
quota established by the regulatory authority allocates anything greater than(less than)
10(15) units of abatement to Source 2(1).8
To see why a trade in Figure 1 is mutually beneficial, assume the regulatory agency
determines that the two sources must clean up 12.5 units each, i.e., each source's initial
abatement allocation is 12.5 units. At this allocation, total variable cost of control for
Source 1 equals area A, while for Source 2 it equals area B + C + D. Therefore, for this
allocation total variable cost across both sources equals A + B + C + D. An incentive to
trade exists for the two sources at this allocation because the marginal cost of control for
Source 2 (point a) is substantially higher than that for Source 1 (point c). Source 2 could
therefore lower its control cost by paying Source 1 something less than a but greater than
c to incrementally increase its abatement from 12.5 so that Source 2 can incrementally
reduce its abatement from 12.5. In other words, point a represents Source 2's WTP for
the first increment of reduction obtained from Source 1, and point c represents Source 1's
minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment from Source 2 for that unit.
Continuing in this manner, until all gains from trade are exhausted, the least-cost
solution is ultimately obtained where the marginal control cost for each source is equated.
In Figure 1, this occurs at point b, where Source 1 cleans up 15 units and Source 2 ten
units, leading to (minimized) total control cost of area A + B + C. In other words,
unrestricted pollution trading naturally leads to the least-cost allocation of abatement
across the two sources. What helps drive this result is the continuity of abatement, and

8

Likewise, Source 1 has incentive to purchase abatement units from Source 2 whenever a quota allocates
anything greater than(less than) 15(10) units of abatement to Source 1(2).

8

thus the smoothly increasing MC curves, as well as the absence of inefficiencies such as
transaction costs, regulatory uncertainty, and asymmetric regulatory treatment.
Moreover, it is easy to see from Figure 1 that regardless of their initial abatement
allocations the sources will always have incentive to trade up to the point where their
marginal abatement cost curves intersect (at point b), i.e., the least-cost solution is
independent of, or insensitive to, the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities. 9
3. An Example of Incremental and Average Control Costs
As mentioned in Section 1, EPA [2004] argues that in the presence of discrete abatement
(which typifies reality), IC is an appropriate estimate of MC when assessing the financial
attractiveness of WQT, and therefore an approximation of a potential buyer's WTP for
abatement credits [EPA, 2004]. To see how IC is calculated, we present hypothetical
cost-of-control and control-effectiveness data for total phosphorus (TP) in Table 1. 10
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
To begin, note that the current loads, target loads, and total reductions needed for
each respective source to comply with the watershed's TMDL for TP are provided in
columns 2 – 4, which, as explained in EPA [2004], are (ideally) obtainable from the
TMDL itself. Next, note that consecutive technology steps are assumed to exist for each
source (except for Stinky's and Smelly's Cheese Factories, which have single technology
steps). For point sources (PSs) such as WWTFs #1 and #2 and the two cheese factories,

9

Unless, of course, the initial abatement allocation in Figure 1 by chance happens to be 15 units to Source
1 and 10 units to Source 2, in which case no trading will take place.
10
The data in Table 1 represents a slightly revised version of that presented in EPA [2004].
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these steps are typically referred to as "tiers" [EPA, 2003]. For NPSs, such as Bob's
Farm, these steps are different BMPs, e.g., conservation tillage, grass buffer strips, etc.11
Each step is associated with incremental and cumulative reductions achieved
(columns 5 and 6 in Table 1) and the incremental reduction needed for compliance with
the TMDL (column 7), which is calculated as the difference between the TP reduction
needed and the incremental reduction achieved. Surplus TP reductions, or credits, are
then calculated in column 8 as the difference between cumulative reductions achieved
and reductions needed (which is zero if the difference is negative). Total control cost in
column 9 (which we henceforth denote as TCj for j = 1,….,m different possible
technology steps) is next, reflecting the annualized fixed, operations, maintenance, and
associated opportunity costs of implementing technology step j. 12
Thus, considering Bob's Farm in Table 1, technology step 1 results in a reduction of
91 lbs. of TP per day at a TC1 of $49,823. This leaves 255 lbs. of TP (364 lbs. – 91 lbs.)
still needing to be reduced. Adding Step 2 technology at a TC2 of $464,444, results in an
additional reduction of 623 lbs. of TP, or a cumulative reduction of 714 lbs. Therefore,
with technology steps 1 and 2, Bob's Farm obtains 368 credits (714 lbs. – 364 lbs.) for
possible sale in a water quality trading market.
IC in column 10 is then calculated as TCj* divided by the incremental reductions
needed for compliance, divided again by 365 (to normalize to a daily basis), where j*
represents the technology step at which the source comes into compliance with its TMDL
abatement allocation. For example, Bob's Farm's IC of $4.99 /lb./day is calculated as
11

For any given source, subsequent technology steps are dependent upon previous steps having been taken,
i.e., step 2 cannot be taken until step 1 has been taken.
12
In particular, TCj equals the sum of (1) fixed cost of installing technology step j/useful life of technology
step j, (2) annual operating and maintenance costs of technology step j, and (3) Opportunity Cost (which
equals the sum of (1) and (2) times the market interest rate).
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($464,444/255 lbs.)/365 days. As defined in EPA [2004], IC therefore represents the cost
per unit reduction that Bob's Farm must incur to ultimately (or incrementally) bring itself
into compliance.
IC is unlikely to be a good estimate of a potential purchasing source's WTP. This is
because a forward-looking source will always base its WTP on MC, even in the case of
discrete abatement.13 As we show below, given the discrete nature of abatement, MCs
are themselves discretely constant (i.e., step-like) over successive technology steps (e.g.,
we can think of there being successive levels of marginal control costs (MC j) defined
over corresponding ranges of abatement). Further, each MCj effectively coincides with
its corresponding Average Control Cost (ACj).14 As we also show in Section 4, IC
generally exceeds ACj, j. Thus, a purchasing source's IC exceeds its WTP.
ACj in column 11 of Table 1 equals TCj divided by technology step j's corresponding
incremental reduction achieved (normalized by 365 days per year). For example, the
AC1 of $1.50/lb./day associated with Bob's Farm's Step 1 technology equals $49,823/91
lbs./365 days. Similarly, the AC2 of $2.04 associated with Bob's Step 2 technology is
equal to ($464,444/623 lbs.)/365 days. Weighted AC in column 12 is a single measure of
average control costs, measured simply as the sum of the ACj's (i.e., jACj) divided by
the total amount of reductions achieved. Continuing with Bob's Farm, its Weighted AC

13

By "forward-looking" we mean that the potential purchasing source understands that if it instead chooses
to abate more than its TMDL abatement allocation it will have credits to sell.
14
For goods that can be produced in continuous units at constant marginal cost, this coincidence occurs
asymptotically. In the case of discrete goods (such as abatement), the coincidence is exact when MC is
measured on a per-unit basis. Note that if we do not measure MC on a per-unit basis, MC of the first
abatement unit of the first technology step equals TC1 and MC of all subsequent abatement units
attributable to the first technology step equal zero. In similar fashion, the marginal cost of the first
abatement unit of the second technology step equals TC2 and MC of all subsequent abatement units
attributable to the second technology step equal zero, and so on with each subsequent technology step.

11

of $1.97 equals (($464,444 + $49,823)/(91 lbs. + 623 lbs.))/365 days, or (91 lbs. / (91 lbs.
+ 623 lbs.)) * $1.50 + (623 lbs. /(91 lbs. + 623 lbs.)) * $2.04.
4. A Formal Comparison of Incremental and Average Control Costs
To compare IC with both ACj and Weighted AC more formally, let A represent a source's
total reduction needed, A1 and A2 represent reductions achieved for the source's
technology steps 1 and 2, respectively, and A = A1 + A2. Assume A ≥ A , i.e., the source
is capable of abating beyond its TMDL abatement allocation. Further, let TC 1 and TC2
represent the annualized control costs associated with achieving A1 and A2, respectively,
and TC = TC1 + TC2. There are two scenarios of particular interest.
Scenario 1
In the first scenario, we assume A1 ≥ A , i.e., the source's step 1 technology is capable of
generating a reduction level that exceeds its total reduction level required by the TMDL.
In this case,

IC =

TC1
TC1
 AC1 =
A
A1

(1)

i.e., IC is at least as large as AC1. Note from the information provided in Table 1, the
three sources meeting the assumption for this scenario – WWTF #1, Stinky's Cheese, and
Smelly's Cheese – all satisfy condition (1). In each case, IC > AC1.
Scenario 2
In the second scenario, A1 < A (but, as assumed earlier, A ≥ A ), i.e., although the
source's step 1 technology is incapable of generating a reduction level that exceeds its
total reduction level required by the TMDL, steps 1 and 2 together are capable of

12

generating such a reduction level. In this case, IC = TC2 /  A - A1  , AC1 = TC1 / A1 ,

AC2 = TC2 / A2 , and Weighted AC = TC/A .
To begin, note that,

TC2 A - A1
TC2
TC

 IC ≥ Weighted AC


TC
A
A - A1 A

(2)

i.e., IC is no less than Weighted AC when the reduction needed from the step 2
technology to ensure TMDL compliance as a percentage of the total reduction possible
from technology steps 1 and 2 is less than the proportion of total control costs attributable
to technology step 2. The comparison in (2) would be relevant for a source that has not
yet implemented any control steps and is considering whether to implement both steps 1
and 2 to ensure TMDL compliance. Note that the inequality is more likely to hold the
more efficient is the source's step 1 technology relative to its step 2 technology. From the
information provided in Table 1, Bob's Farm satisfies condition (2). However, WWTF
#2 does not, i.e., its Weighted AC exceeds its corresponding IC. A relatively high value
of TC2 / TC drives Bob's Farm's result, while a relatively high value of  A - A1  / A (due
to a relatively low value for A1) drives WWTF #2's.
Next, note that
IC ≥ AC2



(3)



since TC2 /  A - A1    TC2 / A 2  . As envisioned in EPA [2004], this comparison is
relevant for a source that had previously implemented step 1 technology and is now
considering whether to implement step 2. In Table 1, both Bob's Farm and WWTF #2
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satisfy condition (3). In the case of Bob's Farm, IC > AC2 because A > A , whereas in
the case of WWTF #2, IC = AC2 because A = A . Lastly,

TC2
TC1
TC2 A - A1

 IC ≥ AC1


TC1
A1
A - A1 A1

(4)

i.e., IC is no less than AC1 when the reduction needed from the step 2 technology to
ensure TMDL compliance as a percentage of the total reduction possible from technology
step 1 is less than the ratio of technology step 2's annualized control cost to step 1's. The
comparison in (4) would be relevant for a source that has not yet implemented any
control steps and is considering whether to implement solely step 1 technology to move
toward TMDL compliance. Similar to the relationship between IC and Weighted AC, this
inequality is more likely to hold the more efficient is the source's step 1 technology
relative to its step 2 technology. From the information provided in Table 1, both Bob's
Farm and WWTF #2 satisfy condition (4). Thus, while WWTF #2's step 1 technology is
efficient enough to ensure IC > AC1, it is not efficient enough to ensure IC > AC2 or IC >
Weighted AC. 15
Conditions (1) – (4) may therefore be summarized as follows. In the case where
technology step 1 is capable of meeting or exceeding the total reduction needed to
comply with the source's TMDL abatement allocation (Scenario 1), IC exceeds its
corresponding AC. In the case where technology step 1 is incapable of meeting the
TMDL allocation (Scenario 2), IC may not exceed its corresponding AC. IC is more
likely to exceed AC the more efficient is the source's step 1 technology relative to its
subsequent technology steps.

15

WWTF #2's AC3 exceeds IC by a relatively large amount due to the relative inefficiency of its step 3
technology relative to its steps 1 and 2 technologies.
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These results are important because given the discrete nature of abatement units, and
thus the coincidence of AC and MC, AC represents a given source's WTP for abatement
credits. In cases where IC exceeds(is exceed by) its corresponding AC, IC is thus
perforce an over-(under-) estimation of WTP. As indicated by some of the costs
calculated in Table 1, this over-(under-) estimation could potentially be quite large.
Empirically speaking, control costs reported in EPA [2003, Exhibit 40] for an exhaustive
list of actual WWTFs located in the Chesapeake Bay study area confirm that for at least
some of those facilities IC is unlikely to exceed its corresponding AC.
5. Water Quality Trading with Discrete Abatement Units
Figure 2 depicts a stylized version of Scenario 2, as well as a discrete version of Figure 1
where the MC (cum "un-weighted" AC) curves similarly "cross" (explained in detail
below). In this figure, a total of A = A1 + A2 units of abatement across both sources is
required by the regulatory authority (superscripts henceforth denote sources 1 and 2). We
assume that A =  A11 + A12  =  A12 + A 22  , i.e., each source on its own has the capability of
meeting the total abatement requirement using both of its technology steps. This
assumption is necessary for admitting the possibility of corner solutions to the trading
problem, and thus extends the range of possible trading scenarios under consideration. 16
Initial abatement allocations from the regulatory authority are labeled A10 and A 02 .
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
To begin, note in Figure 2 that Weighted AC1 > Weighted AC2. Thus, if the WTPs
for sources 1 and 2 are reflected in their respective Weighted ACs rather than their
respective ACjs (discussed below), trading results in a "move" from the initial allocation
16

For example, in Figure 1 this would enable either MC1 to lay everywhere above MC2 or vice-versa, as
long as the lower of the two curves spans the entire horizontal axis.

15





of A10 , A02 to the "corner" allocation of  0, A  , where source 1 abates nothing and source
2 abates the full amount. With respect to the Un-weighted Average Control Cost
measures (i.e., AC11 , AC12 , AC12 , and AC22 ), note that although source 2's successive
average control costs for technology steps 1 and 2 (represented by AC12 up to abatement
level A12 and AC22 up to A , respectively) are exceeded by source 1's corresponding
average control costs (represented by AC11 up to abatement level A12 and AC12 up to A ,
respectively), AC22 nevertheless exceeds AC11 . This is what is meant by the two source's
Un-weighted AC curves crossing. It is a discrete analogue of the two continuous
marginal abatement curves depicted in Figure 1, which, as mentioned in Section 2, is the
classical depiction of the trading problem. 17
To characterize a trading outcome involving sources 1 and 2 using solely the unweighted average control cost measures, we refer to Figure 3, which is a redrawing of
Figure 2 with pertinent rectangular areas demarcated. 18 For example, areas F + G and A
+ B + D represent source 2's total costs of control for technology steps 1 and 2,

17

A second discrete analogue to the classical continuous trading problem – where AC22 exceeds both AC11

and AC12 – is discussed in the Appendix. Note that the ‘double-exceedance’ analogue discussed in the
Appendix is reflected in the potential trading relationship between WWTF #1 and WWTF #2 in Table 1,
where the latter exhibits AC11 , AC12 , and AC13 and the former exhibits AC12 and AC22 ,
with AC12 < AC11 < AC12 < AC13 < AC22 . There are no sources in Table 1 with potential bilateral trading
relationships that correspond to the ‘single-exceedance’ analogue depicted in Figure 3.
18
Given that abatement is achieved in discrete units according to successive technology steps, it seems
most likely that trading decisions will be based on the un-weighted rather than weighted average control
costs.
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respectively, while areas B and C + D + E + F + G similarly represent source 1's
respective total costs of control.19
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
As mentioned in Section 1, to determine a possible trading outcome for sources 1 and
2 we must consider the gains from trade associated with a full sequence of possible sunk





cost trading scenarios in any move away from initial allocation A10 , A02 toward the corner
solution  0, A  .20 The trading scenarios are aligned with the threshold abatement levels
associated with each source’s respective technology steps. For example, in Figure 3 the





first scenario is represented by the move from initial allocation A10 , A02 to
allocation  A11 , A12  , where source 2 reaches the threshold for its first technology step.
The second scenario is represented by the move from allocation  A11 , A12  to  A12 , A 22  ,
where source 1 reaches the threshold for its first technology step. The final scenario is
represented by the move from allocation  A12 , A 22  to  0, A  , where source 2 reaches the
threshold for its second technology step.

19

If Figures 2 and 3 had instead been drawn such that AC22 < AC1j , j = 1,...., m , then similar to the result for

the Weighted ACs discussed above, the corner allocation of  0, A  would naturally obtain through trading.
20

The presumption that trading will move sources 1 and 2 toward allocation  0, A  as opposed to  A, 0  in

Figure 3 is based on the comparison of Weighted AC curves in Figure 2 discussed above, as well as a
comparison of the relative sizes of the sources’ total abatement costs for technology steps 1 and 2 as
depicted in the figure. Because source 1’s total abatement cost (associated with achieving abatement level
A ) of area A + D + F + G is depicted as being less than the corresponding total abatement cost for source 2
(area B + C + D + E + F + G + H) we presume that trading will achieve least total abatement cost at
allocation  0, A  . Obviously, we could have constructed Figure 3 such that least total cost occurs instead at
allocation  A, 0  , in which case our presumption would be that trading moves in that direction. In either

case, we are able to make a direct comparison with the continuous abatement scenario depicted in Figure 1,
which, as stated in Section 1, is the primary purpose of the present analysis.

17

This alignment of trading scenarios with the sources’ respective technology steps
reflects the ‘lumpiness’ of their abatement decisions. In turn, this creates the imputed
sunk costs of abatement upon which the relative values of the abatement units themselves
(i.e., the WTA and WTP measures described in Sections 2 – 4) are determined. In the
end, the trading scenario associated with the largest gains from trade (i.e., WTP – WTA)
is the most likely trading outcome.21
To determine the optimal trading scenario, we begin by assessing the gains from trade
associated with the first of three possible scenarios (moving from the initial









allocation A10 , A02 to allocation A11 , A12 ). Due to the discrete nature of abatement, source
2 incurs a total control cost of area F + G to be able to reach abatement level A 02 with its
step 1 technology. The extra abatement beyond A 02 that source 2 obtains in step 1
(distance A12  A02 ) therefore represents its available abatement credits; credits with an
imputed (sunk) cost of area F.
Based on this imputed cost, source 2’s WTA for these abatement credits is area θFF,
where θF ≥ 0 scales area F according to (i) the probability of source 2 finding a third party
(other than source 1) with which to trade credits A12  A02 and (ii) the price that source 2
ultimately obtains from the third party. For example, a relatively low θF could reflect the
fact that source 2 has a very high probability of selling its credits to a third party, but at a
21

This solution concept assumes that when two sources engage in a trading relationship they consider each
of their mutually beneficial trading options at the outset. This is different than, say, sequential decision
making, where the sources consider each trading option itself as a sequence of separate moves. For


 
 and then



example, under sequential decision making the potential move from allocation A10 , A02 to A12 , A 22 in
Figure 3 is sequenced into two separate moves – first from



 





A10 , A02

 to 

A11 , A12

from A11 , A12 to A12 , A 22 . In this paper, we assume the sources will see no need to sequence a move like
this in such a manner. In other words, the two sources engage in a one-shot rather than a repeated trading
game.
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very low price. A relatively high θF could mean that source 2 has a very low probability
of selling its credits, but at a very high price. As a result, all we can say is that source 2’s
WTA for credits A12  A02 is non-negative.22
Source 1, on the other hand, incurs an added imputed cost of area θEF(E + F) in
moving from A10 to A11 , where, similar to θF, θEF ≥ 0 scales area E + F according to the
probability of source 1 finding a third party (other than source 2) with which to trade
credits A10  A11 and the price that source 1 ultimately obtains from the third party. 23 In
other words, area θEF(E + F) represents source 1’s WTP for source 2’s credits of A12  A02
= A10  A11 . It is the amount source 1 expects to obtain through the sale of its excess
credits A10  A11 .
Sources 1 and 2 therefore have incentive to trade away from the initial allocation

 A , A  to the allocation represented by  A , A  in Figure 3 if
1
0

2
0

1
1

θEF(E + F) > θFF

2
1

(5a)

Condition (5a) can be thought of as a necessary condition for sources 1 and 2 to agree to



 



a move from A10 , A02 to A11 , A12 . For future reference, if condition (5a) holds, we can
define
22

There are two things worthy of note here. First, θF is itself most likely a function of the number of
market participants (i.e., available third parties) as well as expected transaction costs (as in Montero
[1997]). Since the determination of θF is beyond the scope of our analysis, we assume without loss of
generality that it is a constant term. Second, θFF can be considered as the discrete analogue to source 2’s
WTA amount c from source 1 in Figure 1 for an incremental move away from initial allocation (12.5,
12.5). Because marginal abatement costs are incurred incrementally in Figure 1, sunk costs are never
encountered by the sources as they increase their abatement. Therefore, in assessing the potential of any
given bilateral trade in a continuous framework the calculation of the seller’s WTA for its abatement
credits does not require an adjustment for the probability of selling to a third party.
23
Note that prior to trading with source 2, source 1 had abatement credits of A  A10 valued at an imputed
cost of area G + H. By moving from A10 to A11 , source 1 effectively creates additional credits of A10  A11 ,
with an associated imputed value represented by area E + F.

19

Ω1 = θEF(E + F) – θFF > 0

(5b)

as the gains from trade available to sources 1 and 2 associated with the move from

 A , A  to  A , A  .
1
0

2
0

1
1

2
1

Also for future reference, note that the total cost of abatement for

sources 1 and 2 under this possible trading scenario ends up being F + G (the cost to
source 1) plus B + C + D + E + F + G + H – θEF(E + F) – θGH(G + H) (the cost to source
2), where θGH is the scaling factor for area G + H. Compared with the total cost





associated with no trading (i.e., remaining at initial allocation A10 , A02 ) of θFF + G + B +
C + D + E + F + G + H – θGH(G + H), we see that, similar to the standard result for
continuous abatement depicted in Figure 1, the total cost of abatement will necessarily
decrease under the first trading scenario. 24
Next, we consider a second possible trading scenario where sources 1 and 2 instead





have incentive to trade away from allocation A10 , A02 to the allocation represented
by  A12 , A 22  . Following the same approach as for the first trading scenario discussed
above, source 1’s WTP for this move would be the cost savings associated with not
having had to take its second technology step (i.e., area C + D + E + F + G + H) net of its
expected revenue from the sale of abatement credits (area (1 – θGH)(G + H)), where θGH is
the scaling factor corresponding to imputed cost G + H. Source 2’s overall WTA is
comprised of its WTA for credits A12  A02 (area θFF) plus the cost associated with
implementing its step 2 technology (area A + B + D) net of its expected revenue from the

24

The condition for total abatement cost to fall under the first trading scenario relative to no trading reduces
to θFF < θEF(E + F), which is necessary condition (5a). Alternatively stated, the reduction in total abatement
cost for the two sources associated with moving from no trading to the first trading scenario is exactly
equal to the gains from trade, condition (5b), or in the case of continuous abatement, area D in Figure 1.
Similar types of comparisons can be made for the second and third trading scenarios (discussed below)
versus the no-trade scenario.
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sale of abatement credits A  A 22 (area θAB(A + B)), where θAB is the scaling factor
corresponding to imputed cost A + B. Thus, the necessary condition for sources 1 and 2
to agree to a move from  A10 , A02  to  A12 , A 22  can be written as
C + D + E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) > θFF + D + (1 – θAB)(A + B).

(6a)

If condition (6a) holds, we can define
Ω2 = C + E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) – θFF – (1 – θAB)(A + B) > 0

(6b)

as the gains from trade available to sources 1 and 2 associated with the move from

 A , A  to  A , A  .
1
0

2
0

1
2

2
2

In addition, we note that the sufficient condition for moving from

 A , A  to  A , A  , rather than to  A , A  in the first trading scenario, is
1
0

2
0

1
2

2
2

1
1

2
1

Ω2 > Ω1.

(6c)

Thus, if conditions (6a) and (6c) both hold sources 1 and 2 will choose the second trading
scenario over the first. Using the same logic as applied to the first two trading scenarios
discussed above, the necessary condition for instead choosing the third trading scenario –





moving from allocation A10 , A02 all the way to  0, A  in Figure 3 – can be written as,
C + E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) > θFF + A.

(7a)

If condition (7a) holds, we can define
Ω3 = C + E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) – θFF – A > 0

(7b)

as the gains from trade available to sources 1 and 2 associated with the move from

 A , A  to  0, A  .
1
0

2
0

In this case, the sufficient condition for making the move is

Ω3 > Ω2 and Ω3 > Ω1

(7c)

To sum up, if condition (7c) holds sources 1 and 2 will choose the third trading
scenario and thus move from  A10 , A02  to  0, A  . If condition (6c) holds but (7c) does not,
21

sources 1 and 2 will instead choose the second trading scenario and thus move



 



from A10 , A02 to A12 , A 22 . Finally, if neither condition (7c) nor (6c) hold sources 1 and 2



 



will choose the first trading scenario (and move from A10 , A02 to A11 , A12 ) if (5a) holds.
Otherwise, the two sources will not choose to trade and thus remain at initial





allocation A10 , A02 .
It is now easy to see why trading with discrete abatement units is inherently sensitive
to the initial abatement allocation, unlike in the case of continuous abatement. Suppose
the initial allocation in Figure 3 had been located at  A12 , A 22  rather than  A10 , A02  . In this
case, the necessary and sufficient condition for moving from  A12 , A 22  to  0, A  is
B > θAB(A + B).

(8)

Because (8) is fundamentally different than (7c), and thus the necessary and sufficient
conditions underlying the respective moves from  A10 , A02  and  A12 , A 22  to  0, A  likewise
diverge, we cannot conclude that if sources 1 and 2 have chosen to move to the corner





allocation  0, A  from A10 , A02 then they would also necessarily chose to move to  0, A 





from A12 , A 22 . In other words, the outcome in Figure 3 is indeed sensitive to the initial
allocation of abatement responsibilities.
6. Conclusions
This paper has answered three questions related to the discrete nature of pollution
abatement. The first question is, does incremental control cost necessarily exceed its
corresponding average control cost, as presented in EPA (2004)? The answer is no.
When its first technology step is incapable of achieving the source's target load, and the
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source has not previously implemented its first technology step, incremental control cost
exceeds its corresponding average control cost only when the efficiency of its step 1
technology is large enough relative to its subsequent technology steps.
The second question – is a source's incremental control cost a better approximation of
its willingness to pay for abatement credits than its average control cost? – again elicits
the answer no. In the presence of discrete abatement units, average control cost is
identically equal to marginal control cost. Since in general any source is capable of being
a buyer or a seller of pollution reduction credits, the source's willingness to pay is
ultimately equal to its marginal (and thus its average) control cost.
Lastly, how exactly does bilateral trading in the presence of discrete abatement differ
from trading in the presence of continuous abatement? To this question we offer two
answers. First, unlike with continuous abatement the trading outcome with discrete
abatement units is determined by comparing the gains from trade associated with the full
sequence of possible “sunk cost trading” scenarios. Second, the trading outcome with
discrete abatement is generally dependent upon the initial allocation of abatement
responsibilities. This, in turn, suggests that the numerical evidence provided in Montero
[1997] relating the sensitivity of the trading outcome to the constancy of transaction costs
in the presence of discrete abatement, is in fact more general than previously thought.
Indeed, in the case where trading partners' average control cost curves "cross," the trading
outcome is inherently sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities.
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Appendix
This appendix considers the case where, similar to Figure 3 in the text, the Un-weighted
abatement cost curves for sources 1 and 2 cross. However, while the cost curve for
source 2’s first technology step lies everywhere beneath source 1’s cost curves for both
its first and second technology steps (as in Figure 3), the cost curve for source 2’s second
technology step lays everywhere above both of source 1’s cost curves. This case is
depicted in Figure A1.
[INSERT FIGURE A1 HERE]
Following the same solution procedure as used Section 5, we first note that the
necessary condition for, and the gains from trade associated with, a move from initial









allocation A10 , A02 to allocation A11 , A12 in Figure A1 (i.e., the first trading scenario) are
identical to conditions (5a) and (5b), respectively. With respect to the second trading
scenario, conditions (6a) and (6b) become, respectively,
D + E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) > θFF + C + D + (1 – θAB)(A + B)

(6a′)

Ω2 = E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) – θFF – C – (1 – θAB)(A + B) > 0.

(6b′)

and

Based on conditions (5b) and (6b′), (6c) is also the relevant sufficient condition for the
second trading scenario in Figure A1.
With respect to the third trading scenario, conditions (7a) and (7b) become,
respectively,
E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) > θFF + A + C.

(7a′)

Ω3 = E + F + (1 – θGH)(G + H) – θFF – A - C > 0

(7b′)

and

24

Based on (5b), (6b′), and (7b′), condition (7c) is also the relevant sufficient condition for
the third trading scenario in Figure A1.
As in the text, we now suppose the initial allocation in Figure A1 had been located









at A12 , A 22 rather than A10 , A02 . In this case, the necessary and sufficient condition for





moving from A12 , A 22 to  0, A  would still be (8). Thus, as in the case of Figure 3, the
outcome in Figure A1 is indeed sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement
responsibilities.
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Figure 1. Water Quality Trading in the Presence of Continuous Abatement Units.
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Figure 2. Water Quality Trading in the Presence of Discrete Abatement Units.
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Figure 3. Likely Trading Outcome in the Presence of Discrete Abatement Units.
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Figure A1. Another Example of Discrete Abatement.
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Table 1. Hypothetical Cost of Control and Control Effectiveness Data. *
Source

Current
Load

Target
Load

Reduction
Needed

Bob's Farm
Step 1
Step 2

873

527

346

WWTF #1
Step 1
Step 2

917

Stinky's
Cheese
WWTF #2
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Smelly's
Cheese

633

410

288

72

25

47

166

Cumulative
Reduction
Achieved

Reduction
Needed for
Compliance

Credits

TC

IC

AC

Weight.
AC

91
623

91
714

255
0

0
368

49,823
464,444

--4.99

1.50
2.04

--1.97

662
107

662
769

0
0

378
485

2,074,237
5,222,364

20.01
---

8.58
133.72

--26.00

506

506

0

218

6,308,251

60.01

34.16

34.16

10
37
20

10
47
67

37
0
0

0
0
20

56,032
219,022
339,450

--16.22
---

15.35
16.22
46.50

----25.13

163

163

0

55

590,906

14.99

9.93

9.93

284

698

274

Incremental
Reduction
Achieved

108

*The actual Excel spreadsheet in electronic form for this figure is available upon request from the author. All physical measurements (e.g., Current Load, Target
Load, etc.) are in lbs. per day. TC is measured in dollars, IC is in dollars per reduction needed for compliance, AC is in dollars per incremental reduction
achieved, and Weighted AC is in dollars per weighted average of incremental reductions achieved.
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